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Abstract
This study extends dynamic models of renewable terrestial resources to evaluate the
optimal long-run management strategy for African Elephants. Changes in many model
parameters have ambiguous effects on elephant stocks and point to a need for empirical
research to provide parameterizations for a theoretical model and a better basis for policy.1
1  Introduction
1.1  Background and Motivation. The purpose of this study is to determine the
effect of alternative elephant management strategies on African economic welfare and
long-term elephant stocks, with particular emphasis on the economics of elephant-human
interactions in elephant range areas.  The African elephant contributes multiple outputs of
value, including those from consumptive direct use (products like ivory, meat, hides, and
trophy hunting); non-consumptive direct use (tourism); indirect use (ecological role as a
keystone species); and non-use (preservation of its existence).  Elephants also have a
social  opportunity cost via their use of base resources such as land.  Additional direct
costs result from its requirements for management resources like game wardens and from
the damage it causes to crops, property, and human life (Swanson, 1994; Sutton, 1997).
Elephant management has been a topic of international debate as elephant
populations have declined rapidly.  During the 1980's, the African elephant population
was estimated to have halved from 1.2 million to 600,000 individuals, and there were
concerns that the elephant would be driven to extinction (Barbier et al., 1990).  Primary
responsibility for this decline has been attributed to the poaching of elephants for ivory
(Beddington et al., 1989; Milner-Gulland and Mace, 1991).  It is usually assumed that
poaching occurred due to the high international price of ivory and African governments’
lack of means to protect elephants, i.e., open access property rights.  One strategy
proposed to stem the elephant’s decline was an international ban on trade in elephant
products, eventually implemented via the Appendix I listing of the elephant by the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) in 1990.  The ban and
the accompanying negative publicity were expected to sharply reduce the ivory trade.2
With little or no market for ivory, the price paid to poachers and, thus, elephant poaching
were expected to decrease.  This may not occur.  Poaching may not be sensitive to the
changes in the price that the ban can achieve since the price paid poachers is already so
low.  The ban also significantly reduced the revenue generated from elephants (Barnes,
1996) and contributed to a decline in anti-poaching budgets that threatens countries’
ability to protect elephants. Even where poaching has been substantial, it may be a
symptom of a more fundamental elephant-human conflict.  Parker and Graham (1989a)
assert that “humans and elephants are complete competitors.”  Maintaining an elephant
population requires social investments, yet elephants generate large negative externalities
for people living near them (O’Connell, 1995).  The opportunity cost of habitat is rising
as human populations increase and economies develop.
1.2  Overview of Renewable Resources.  Early analyses of overexploited
renewable resources focused on the negative effect of open-access property rights
(Gordon, 1954).  It was later shown that even under private ownership, a high
opportunity cost of capital, a high price/cost ratio of the yield, and a low biological
species growth rate can make extinction economically optimal (Clark, 1973; Spence,
1975).  In these models, a resource price increase always decreases the optimal resource
stock (Caputo, 1989).  This result appears to be a motivating force behind the ivory ban
(Barbier et al., 1990). Recent work recognizes that models developed for marine
resources may not be adequate for terrestrial renewable resources.  Models of the latter
emphasize competition for resources and the potential for extinction via disinvestment in
one species when it      does not generate economically competitive rates of return
(Swallow, 1990; Swanson, 1994).  This approach suits elephants that must compete with3
humans for resources.
Schultz and Skonhoft (1996) develop a wildlife management model with two
agents: a park service that receives the benefits from wildlife and a group of agro-
pastoralists that incur the costs.  Their model is essentially a special case of Swallow's,
with the non-renewable resource quantity (land) fixed.  Our model extends their work to
apply it to the African elephant and other multi-value terrestrial species.  The new model
includes the expenses incurred by the park service for anti-poaching activities and allows
for agro-pastoralists’ agricultural decisions to affect the damages from wildlife.  These
additions, along with allowance for harvest costs that are non-linear in the harvest rate,
lead to a more general and realistic model.  This study also empiricizes the model for the
African elephant; most other efforts have been purely theoretical (except for Milner-
Gulland and Leader-Williams, 1992).
1.3 Objectives and Methodology. Using the techniques of optimal control, our
model captures the main dynamic tradeoffs in the management of a terrestrial species
such as the elephant.  The harvest of elephants today will affect the biological growth rate
and hence the future elephant population.  The decision-making process should determine
the optimal time path of harvest over the relevant planning horizon, not just for the
current period. In addition to the typical control variable for harvest, the model for
elephants includes a control for land in the state equation and includes expenses for
management.  The model is designed to capture the following tradeoffs: consumptive vs.
non-consumptive use values (i.e. harvest elephants for ivory vs. preserve them for
tourism benefits); stock levels vs. negative externalities from damages; allocating base
resources to maintain elephant stocks vs. allocating them to competing economic4
investments; allocating management services to protect elephants vs. allocating them to
alternative economic activities; harvesting today vs. in the future.
2  Theoretical Model
2.1  Physical Characteristics.  Two activities compete for rural land in
developing African range states such as Namibia.  Land will either be allocated to a
wildlife reserve or to agricultural production.  Thus, there is a land constraint given by
where W(t) is land for wildlife habitat at time t, A is agricultural land at time t, and L is
the total land, which is assumed to be fixed over time. Where land has positive
opportunity cost, this constraint is expected to hold with equality (Schulz and Skonhoft,
1996).
The elephant population is governed by a biological growth function (Clark,
1990; Swallow, 1990; Swanson, 1994).  If x(t) is the total number of elephants (the stock)
in the management area at time t, dx/dt is the rate of stock growth, or the recruitment.
The growth rate depends on the natural growth function F and the total harvest rate at
time t, h(t).  Unlike traditional renewable resource models developed for marine
resources that are only a function of the resource stock x, this growth function also
depends on land allocated to elephants W.  Thus,
where “:=” means “equals by definition.” It will be assumed that F(0,W) = F(K,W) = 0,
where K is the carrying capacity; F > 0 for 0 < x < K and W > 0; Fx > or < 0; FW > 0,
F(X,0) = 0; Fxx < 0, FWW < 0.  So, more land allocated to elephant habitat will shift the
growth curve outward, but at a decreasing rate.  It will also be assumed that FxW = FWx >
0, so that more land allocated to elephant habitat will increase the marginal growth rate.
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A logistic model of population dynamics can be used to describe changes in the
elephant herd over time (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams, 1992; Fowler 1981,
1984).  Given the assumptions above, the model exhibits pure compensation and has
standard properties with respect to x (Clark, 1990).  The model is modified by z to take
account of the non-linear response of large mammals to density.  In addition, to
incorporate the effect of habitat allocation on the elephant population, let W be the
amount of land allocated to elephants in km
2.  K(W) is then the land-dependent carrying





















- = , ,  where i is the
intrinsic rate of population growth and the parameter z > 0 describes the asymmetric
shape of the density-dependent response.
1  This functional form will satisfy the
assumptions made above about F.
2  The growth function F assumes a homogeneous herd
composition and does not allow for differences in age or gender structure.  This
simplification may not be unrealistic.  In areas where elephant densities are too high,
effective population management requires requires the culling of entire herds at once and
not the taking of individual animals (Child, 1995).  2.2  The Park Service’s Problem.
The park service maximizes the present discounted value of the flow of net elephant
stock benefits, including consumptive and non-consumptive use benefits which depend
on the elephant stock and harvest rate, as well as the size of park land.  The park service
                                               
1 A z of 7 is used for elephants, which skews the logistic growth curve to the right so that
the Maximum Sustainable Yield stock is 0.75K instead of the usual 0.5K for z = 1.  It has
been estimated that i = 0.067 and K = 2/km
2 (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams,
1992).
2 If  K(W) = W
1/q then the desirable properties hold for 0 < z/q <1.6
does not incur costs from elephant damage agro-pastoralists; the park service’s
instantaneous net benefit function is
() ( ) ( ) E v h x w x W E x T w h x C h p ; , ; , - + - × = P .
Here ph is the constant price of harvested elephant products h.  The park service for a
country like Namibia is a price taker in this market because it does not have enough
elephants to influence world prices.  The price of the variable input to elephant harvest,
or effort, is wv and is assumed constant.  T is the net benefit of tourism services, which is
a function of the elephant stock.  It is assumed that a higher stock of elephants implies
higher profits from tourism, but at a decreasing rate.  So T(0) = 0, Tx > 0, and Txx < 0.
The cost of harvest function C in the park service’s problem is defined as
() ( ) {} e x G h t s e w w h x C v e v , . . min : ; , = × =
where G is the harvest production function and e is the variable input (effort) (Caputo,
1989).  Assuming the Hessian of G is negative definite in (x,e) and Gex > 0, it follows
that
C : X ´ H ´ R++ ® R+, C Î C
(2), Cx < 0, Ch > 0, Cw > 0,
Cxx > 0, Chh > 0, ChhCxx – (Chx)
2 > 0, Chx < 0, Cxw < 0, Chw > 0.
These properties hold " (x,h;wv) Î X ´ H ´ R++.
E is the park service's anti-poaching enforcement cost function.  This can be
thought of as being the product of a sub-optimization problem similar to that for the
harvest cost function C.  In order for Namibia to resume trade in raw ivory, the CITES
Standing Committee must verify that anti-poaching laws are being enforced in
accordance with the resolutions of the June 1997 CITES Conference of the Parties
(TRAFFIC, 1997; CITES, 1997).  These resolutions will be interpreted to mean that the7
park service must establish property rights over the elephant in order for the ivory trade
to resume (which is the goal of the park service).  Namibia has already successfully
deterred poaching (Rodwell et al., 1996; pers. comm.) and  elephant populations have
been increasing. Thus, the park service’s enforcement sub optimization problem is
defined as
() ( ) {} 0 , , . . min : ; , = × = W x l P t s l w w W x E E l E , where l is the variable input to anti-
poaching enforcement and wE > 0 is the wage.  P is the poaching production function,
which decreases with enforcement l and increases in both the density of elephants x and
and the amount of elephant habitat W, i.e. Pl < 0, Px > 0, and PW > 0.
3  Assuming P is
strictly quasiconcave in (l,x) and in (l,W), and l
* is convex in (x,W), it follows that
Ex > 0, EW > 0, Ew > 0, Exx < 0, EWW < 0, EWw > 0, Exw = Ewx > 0.
2.3 The Agro-Pastoralists’ Problem.  The second agent, the group of agro-
pastoralists, wishes to maximize the present discounted value of the net benefits from
agricultural production on the land.  However, agro-pastoralists suffer negative
externalities from the local stock of elephants that compete for the same land resource
and sometimes migrate through agricultural land in search of food and water.  These
externalities include crop damage (from eating or trampling), reduced livestock
production due to competition between elephants and livestock for forage/browse and
water, and destruction of water facilities, fences, and granaries.  Farmers sometimes lose
their entire crop to elephants during a single night (Child, 1995).  Damages are a function
of the elephant stock and the behavior of agro-pastoralists.  For simplicity, the only
                                               
3 Poaching is not a function of ivory price ph. because the opportunity cost of hunters is so
far below the price of ivory (Barbier et al., 1990).8
behavior modeled is the use of land.  This aspect of the problem is later expanded upon
and made the focus of empirical work.  The agro-pastoralists’ instantaneous net benefits
function is
() ( ) d d ; , ; A x D p A J a a - = P .  Here J is the agricultural benefits function in the absence of
externalities, which depends on the use of land for agricultural activities, A.  Benefits
increase with land use at a decreasing rate, so J(0;pa) = 0, JA > 0, JAA < 0.  In addition, a
higher producer price pa for the agro-pastoralists increases the benefits as well as the
marginal benefits from land, so Jp > 0, JAp = JpA > 0.
D is the damage function, reflecting elephants’ influence on agricultural
production.  Damage costs increase with the stock of elephants at an increasing rate:
D(0,A;d) = 0, Dx > 0, and Dxx > 0.  Schultz and Skonhoft asssume Dxx £ 0, without
explanation.  Damages also depend on agro-pastoralists’ land use.  The more land in
cropping as opposed to livestock production, the higher the expected damage.  Also, the
higher the proportion of total land devoted to agriculture, the higher the expected
damage.  Because opportunity for conflict increases as habitat shrinks, D(x,0;d) = 0, DA
> 0, DAA > 0.  An increase in elephant stock should also increase the marginal damage to
an additional unit of land in agricultural production, so DxA = DAx >0.  The curvature
assumptions for D are empirically verifiable and will be tested with data from household
surveys.
The vector d represents shift parameters affecting damages incurred by the agro-
pastoralists as the elephant stock and land allocated to agriculture vary.  A shift parameter
could represent: the proportion of total agricultural production in crops vs. livestock, as
one might expect livestock production to be more compatible with elephants than crop9
production; the crop mix, as elephants might prefer some crops to others, or favor crops
that are plentiful during seasons when their natural food supplies are low; or other
changes in agricultural practices, such as production intensification or the use of
irrigation.  A shift could also be caused by agro-pastoralists’ efforts to deter elephant
damage, such as building a fence or posting a guard; or a change in physical
characteristics such as the amount of rainfall or quality of soil (Parker and Graham,
1989a).  Assuming that parameters in d shift the damage function down at a decreasing
rate, i.e.,  Dd < 0 and Ddd > 0, marginal damages from increased elephant density and
agro-pastoral expansion decrease with d, so Dxd = Ddx < 0 and DAd = DdA < 0.  The
empirical portion of the study will focus on such aspects.  Previous studies have
quantifed the total damage done by wildlife in a region (see e.g. O’Connell, 1995), but
have not attempted to characterize a damage function like D. D could also be thought of
as the net value of externalities generated by elephants. The theoretical problem is
qualitatively the same if agro-pastoralists receive benefits for services provided to the
tourism industry, though these benefits must be included in the empirical model.  Finally,
the elephant probably confers some indirect non-consumptive existence value.  This is
essentially a public good and is represented by I(x), where I(0) = 0, Ix > 0, and Ixx < 0.  
2.4  Overall Optimality: The Social Planner’s Problem.  The social planner
maximizes the net present value of an infinite stream of benefits from the elephant stock,
given its land use, and resources used in agricultural production with their land use.
There are tradeoffs in setting the size of the elephant herd and in allocating land between
the two activities. T and I are both non-consumptive benefits of the elephant stock with
similar properties.  They can be combined into the term B(x) := T(x) + I(x), with B(0) =10
0, Bx > 0, and Bxx < 0.  Thus the problem, with constraints, and endpoint conditions,
becomes
()
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where x
*(a) represents the steady-state elephant population, the arrival at which is
assumed to be a management goal, a := (ph,pa,wv,wE,L,d,r) and b := (a,x0) are parameter
vectors, and r > 0 is the discount rate. The current-value Hamiltonian is defined as
[] h W x F W L x D p W L J w W x E x B w h x C h p W h x H a E v h - + - - - + - + - × = ) , ( ) ; , ( ) ; ( ) ; , ( ) ( ) ; , ( : ) , , ( l d
where the elephant stock x is the state variable, and elephant harvest h and allocation of
land to elephants W are the control variables.  By the Dynamic Envelope Theorem and
the Principle of Optimality, l(t;b) is the current-value shadow value to society of an
addition of one elephant to the stock at any point in time t (Caputo, 1996).  Since the land
constraint must hold with equality, (L-W) has been substituted for A in the Hamiltonian.
The necessary conditions for an interior solution imply that




D J E - +
= l  so that at the optimum, the current value shadow
value of an addition to the elephant stock equals the marginal profit of harvest or the net
marginal cost of an additional elephant due to the expansion of habitat by one unit.  Note
that l must be positive for an interior solution.
2.5  Results.  One relationship that is useful for signing comparative statics is Dax
+ lFWx – EWx which is the net effect of a change in the elephant population density on the
marginal land value.  This will be referred to as the elephant marginal land value effect
( )()( )( )( ) [] dt e t A t x D p t A J w t x t W E t x B w t h t x C t h p V
rt
0
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(EMLV).  Assuming the Arrow sufficient condition for a maximum holds (see Caputo,
1996), a negative EMLV, and Fx < 0, then |Jd| < 0 and the following comparative statics
can be derived
? ; 0 ; ? ; 0 ; ? ; 0






























For each parameter increase under the stated assumptions, the current-value
shadow value of elephants l
* will increase, while the change in the optimal stock size x
*
is ambiguous.  If the above assumptions are altered, then even the sign for the change in
l
* is ambiguous.  The ambiguity of the above comparative statics implies that the effects
of changes in parameters on the optimal controls h
*(a) and W
*(a) will also be
ambiguous. These results differ from those derived from the prototypical renewable
resources model which does not contain a control for base resource allocation to the
renewable resource under management, nor does it include costs of enforcement or
damage, nor benefits from viewing.  Thus, the prototypical model is unable to
realistically portray the tradeoffs inherent in the management of a multi-value terrestrial
species such as the elephant.  That is why the prototypical model generates results such as
¶x
*/¶ph < 0 unequivocally.  Such results are unrealistic, at least for the case of the
elephant, and can lead to potentially counter-productive management policies such as the
ivory ban.
In contrast, the results of the model presented here are much richer in their
possibilities.  For example, given the increased incentive to allocate habitat to elephants
created by an increase in ph,, an increase in the ivory price can increase the optimal herd,
i.e. ¶x
*/¶ph > 0.  Similarly, an increase in elephant-damage deterrents d might decrease12
the optimal herd.  The reduction in elephant damage from, for example, fencing
agricultural land can make it more profitable to convert elephant habitat into agricultural
land.  This result is contrary to conventional wisdom (i.e., that reducing elephant-human
conflict will contribute to elephant conservation; see e.g. O’Connell, 1995) and could
have important policy implications. Finally, there is the unintuitive result that an increase
in the price of agricultural output pa might lead to an increase in the optimal elephant
stock.  This is possible because the value of damaged crops will be greater, so there will
be incentive to reduce agricultural land in order to reduce damages from elephants.  The
resultant increase in elephant habitat will produce larger herds.  But again, the sign of this
change depends on the model’s parameter values.13
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